Stanley, J. Secondly, one might wonder if Wilkenfelds account of understanding as representation manipulation is too inclusivethat it rules in, as cases of bona fide understanding, representations that are based on inaccurate but internally consistent beliefs. epistemological shift pros and cons. Boston: Routledge, 2013. Pritchard, D. The Value of Knowledge: Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. Kvanvig, J. Offers an account of understanding that requires having a theory of the relevant phenomenon. Regarding factivity, then, it seems there is room for a view that occupies the middle ground here. Make sure you cite them appropriately within your paper and list them in APA format on your Reference page. Why We Dont Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 156 (2007). The modern epistemology deals with the debate between rationalism and empiricism. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). This view, embraced by DePaul and Grimm (2009), implies that to the extent that understanding and knowledge come apart, it is not with respect to a difference in susceptibility to being undermined by epistemic luck. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Solicitar ms informacin: 310-2409701 | administracion@consultoresayc.co. Though in light of this fact, it is not obvious that understanding is the appropriate term for this state. In particular, one might be tempted to suggest that some of the objections raised to Grimms non-propositional knowledge-of-causes model could be recast as objections to Khalifas own explanation-based view. This is a change from the past. So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. See answer source: Epistemology in an Hour Caleb Beers (iii) an ability to draw from the information that q the conclusion that p (or that probably p). In all these cases, epistemology seeks to understand one or another kind of cognitive success (or, correspondingly, cognitive failure ). With each step in the sequence, we understand the motion of the planets better than we did before. A view on which the psychics epistemic position in this case qualifies as understanding-why would be unsatisfactorily inclusive. His central claim in his recent work is that understanding can be viewed as knowledge of causes, though appreciating how he is thinking of this takes some situating, given that the knowledge central to understanding is non-propositional. Criticizes the claim that understanding-why should be identified with strong cognitive achievement. But, the chief requirement of understanding, for him, is instead that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agents collection of information (that is, that the agent has a grasp of how all this related information fits together. Furthermore, Section 3 considers whether characterizations of understanding that focus on explanation provide a better alternative to views that capitalize on the idea of manipulating representations, also giving due consideration to views that appear to stand outside this divide. In order to illustrate this point, Kvanvig invites us to imagine a case where an individual reads a book on the Comanche tribe, and she thereby acquires a belief set about the Comanche. Kelps account, then, explains our attributions of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such well-connected knowledge. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. Knowledge is almost universally taken to be to be factive (compare, Hazlett 2010). One can split views on this question into roughly three positions that advocate varying strengths of a factivity constraint on objectual understanding. In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). Divides recent views of understanding according to whether they are manipulationist or explanationst; argues for a different view according to which understanding is maximally well-connected knowledge. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (Vol. Assume that the surgeon is suffering from the onset of some degenerative mental disease and the first symptom is his forgetting which blood vessel he should be using to bypass the narrowed section of the coronary artery. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. For example, Hills (2009: 4) says you cannot understand why p if p is false (compare: S knows that p only if p). . Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. Discusses whether intellectualist arguments for reducing know-how to propositional knowledge might also apply to understanding-why (if it is a type of knowing how). However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. Consider how some people think they grasp the ways in which their zodiac sign has an influence on their life path, yet their sense of understanding is at odds with the facts of the matter. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. A good example here is what Riggs (2003) calls intelligibility, a close cousin of understanding that also implies a grasp of order, pattern and connection, but does not seem to require a substantial connection to truth. However, this concern might be abated with the addition of a moderate factivity constraint (for example, the constraint discussed in section two above) that rules out cases of mere intelligibility or subjective understanding). Thirdly, even if one accepts something like a moderate factivity requirement on objectual understandingand thus demand of at least a certain class of beliefs one has of a subject matter that they be trueone can also ask further and more nuanced questions about the epistemic status of these true beliefs. Riggs (2003: 21-22) asks whether an explanation has to be true to provide understanding, and Strevens thinks that it is implied that grasping is factive. Khalifas (2013) view of understanding is a form of explanatory idealism. To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b). As it turns out, not all philosophers who give explanation a central role in an account of understanding want to dispense with talk of grasping altogether, and this is especially so in the case of objectual understanding. For example, we might suppose that a system of beliefs contains only beliefs about a particular subject matter, and that these beliefs will ordinarily be sufficient for a rational believer who possesses them to answer questions about that subject matter reliably. The notion of curiosity that plays a role in Kvanvigs line is a broadly inclusive one that is meant to include not just obvious problem-solving examples but also what he calls more spontaneous examples, such as turning around to see what caused a noise you just heard. Examples of the sort considered suggest thateven if understanding has some important internalist component to ittransparency of the sort Zagzebski is suggesting when putting forward the KU claim, is an accidental property of only some cases of understanding and not essential to understanding. Pritchard, D. Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008): 325-39. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. This is a change from the past. Are the prospects of extending understanding via active externalism on a par with the prospects for extending knowledge, or is understanding essentially internal in a way that knowledge need not be? Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. London: Routledge, 2009. This type of a view is a revisionist theory of epistemic value (see, for example, Pritchard 2010), which suggests that one would be warranted in turning more attention to an epistemic state other than propositional knowledgespecifically, according to Pritchardunderstanding. Hazlett, A. Kelp (2015) makes a helpful distinction between two broad camps here. On such a view, grasping talk could simply be jettisoned altogether. (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. If so, why, and if not why not? Achievements are thought of as being intrinsically good, though the existence of evil achievements (for example, skillfully committing genocide) and trivial achievements (for example, competently counting the blades of grass on a lawn) shows that we are thinking of successes that have distinctive value as achievements (Pritchard 2010: 30) rather than successes that have all-things-considered value. Carter, J. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. This aside, can we consider extending Grimms conception of understanding as non-propositional knowledge of causes to the domain of objectual understanding? Rohwers inventive move involves a contrast case featuring unifying understanding, that is, understanding that is furnished from multiple sources, some good and some bad. Grimm, S. Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515-535. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Alston, W. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Claims that understanding is entirely compatible with both intervening and environmental forms of veritic luck. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Just as we draw a distinction between this epistemic state (that is, intelligibility, or what Grimm calls subjective understanding) and understanding (which has a much stricter factivity requirement), it makes sense to draw a line between grasping* and grasping where one is factive and the other is not. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. As will see, a good number of epistemologists would agree that false beliefs are compatible with understanding. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. Trout, J.D. He concedes, though, that sometimes curiosity on a smaller scale can be sated by epistemic justification, and that what seems like understanding, but is actually just intelligibility, can sate the appetite when one is deceived. If, as robust virtue epistemologists have often insisted, cognitive achievement is finally valuable (that is, as an instance of achievements more generally), and understanding necessarily lines up with cognitive achievement but knowledge only sometimes does, then the result is a revisionary story about epistemic value. Greco, J. 1. A discussion of whether linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge. Zagzebskis weak approach to a factivity constraint aligns with her broadly internalist thinking about what understanding actually does involvenamely, on her view, internal consistency and what she calls transparency. A theoretical advantage to a weak factivity constraint is that it neatly separates propositional knowledge and objectual understanding as interestingly different. Riaz (2015), Rohwer (2014) and Morris (2012) have continued to uphold this line on understandings compatibility with epistemic luck and defend this line against some of the objections that are examined below. Although a range of epistemologists highlighting some of the important features of understanding-why and objectual understanding have been discussed, there are many interesting topics that warrant further research. In this Gettier-style case, she has good reason to believe her true beliefs, but the source of these beliefs (for example, the rumor mill) is highly unreliable and this makes her beliefs only luckily true, in the sense of intervening epistemic luck. For, even if understanding why 22=4 does not require a grasp of any causal relation, it might nonetheless involve a grasp of some kind of more general dependence, for instance the kind of dependence picked out by the metaphysical grounding relation. In addition, it is important to make explicit differences in terminology that can sometimes confuse discussions of some types of understanding. It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that humans did not evolve. This section considers the connection between understanding-why and truth, and then engages with the more complex issue of whether objectual understanding is factive. Here, and unlike in the case of intervening epistemic luck, nothing actually goes awry, and the fact that the belief could easily have been false is owed entirely to the agents being in a bad environment, one with faades nearby.
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